Carneades' quip : Orality, philosophy, wit, and the poetics of impromptu quotation by Usher, M. D.
Oral Tradition, 21/1 (2006): 190-209  
 
 
 
 
 
Carneades’ Quip: Orality, Philosophy, Wit,  
and the Poetics of Impromptu Quotation 
 
M. D. Usher 
 
 
 
In spite of a long and influential philosophical career, when Carneades 
of Cyrene (214-129 BC), head of the Academy in its skeptical phase, died at 
age eighty-five, he left behind no written works. There were, we are told, 
some letters extant in Diogenes Laertius’ time addressed to Ariarathes, king 
of Cappadocia, but Carneades’ philosophical opinions were conveyed orally 
and transmitted to posterity in written form only by his students (D.L. 4.65).
1
 
In this respect Carneades resembles not only Pythagoras and Socrates before 
him and Epictetus later, but also his Skeptic predecessors Pyrrho and 
Arcesilaus, whose refusal to commit their ideas to writing was a conscious 
protest against philosophical dogmatism.
2
  
And yet, while not a writer, Carneades’ devotion to the word was total 
and complete: he let his hair and fingernails grow weirdly long, Diogenes 
Laertius reports, because he was so engrossed in philosophical debate 
(ajscoliva/ th'/ peri; tou;" lovgou"; D.L. 4.62), and his skills as a 
dialectician, conversationalist, and orator were by all accounts astounding. 
Indeed, Carneades’ mastery of forms of oral expression became the stuff of 
legend: his booming voice brought him humorously into conflict with the 
local gymnasiarch (D.L. 4.63). Professional orators, it is said, would cancel 
their own classes in order to attend his lectures (D.L. 4.62). He became 
                                                
1
 Chief among whom was the Carthaginian Hasdrubal, Carneades’ prolific 
successor, known by his adoptive Greek name, Clitomachus. None of Clitomachus’ many 
works survive, though Cicero and Sextus Empiricus preserve a good deal of Carneades’ 
thought. All extant fragments and testimonia with commentary may be found in Mette 
1985:55-141; select passages with English translation and commentary in Long and 
Sedley 1987, vol. 1:438-88 and vol. 2:432-75. 
 
2
 Cf. D.L. 4.32 (of Arcesilaus), with Long 1985:80, 94. Plato’s injunction that the 
philosopher should consider writing nothing more than an amusement (paidia; cf. 
Phaedrus 274b-76d) was perhaps also a factor. 
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something of a celebrity in 155, when, as one of three philosopher-envoys 
the Athenians sent to Rome in order to appeal a large fine,
 
Carneades gave a 
stunning pair of lectures before the Senate on successive days, one in 
defense of justice and one against. His rhetorical tour de force on that 
famous occasion not only fired the imaginations of a whole generation of 
young Roman intellectuals (much to the chagrin of Cato the Censor), but it 
somehow managed to succeed in reducing the fine as well.
 3
 
Another verbal art form at which Carneades seems to have been adept 
is the spontaneous quotation of poetry, and this paper explores aspects of 
orality, philosophy, and wit in the Hellenistic age using Carneades’ 
quotations as a lens. Our specific topic is a short series of one-liners from 
Homer and Sophocles—a short cento, in fact
4
—that was exchanged between 
the philosopher and one of his pupils (an episode preserved in Diogenes 
Laertius’ life of Carneades: D.L. 4.63-4). This passage, at one level so 
typical of the anecdotes one finds in Diogenes, has attracted practically no 
attention,
5
 yet it is a case study in miniature that provides an illuminating 
glimpse into the reception and reworking of oral and orally-derived poetry 
and myth in the Hellenistic age. Of particular interest are traces of the kind 
of associative thinking that characterizes oral poetic composition.
6
 But 
Carneades’ cento also suggests that the aesthetics and communicative power 
of “traditional referentiality”—Foley’s shorthand term for the way oral 
poetic structures (and thus the orally-derived texts that were read by ancient 
readers) convey meaning differently than literary ones—did not die out 
completely with the establishment of literacy, but were operative even in the 
                                                
3
 The other members of the delegation were Critolaus the Peripatetic and the Stoic 
Diogenes of Babylon. On the historical background, see Habicht 1997:264-69. On the 
cultural fallout of this diplomatic mission at Rome—a case of Graecia capta if ever there 
was one—see Astin 1978:169-81. 
 
4
 A cento (from a Greek word meaning “embroidery” or “pastiche”) is a poem or 
literary work consisting of material taken from other, pre-existing source texts. For an 
overview of the form, see Salanitro 1997. 
 
5
 Salanitro (1997:2328), following Stemplinger (1912:194), makes passing 
reference, but offers no analysis. 
 
6
 The point of departure here is Jousse’s 1925 study of the mnemotechnics of an 
oral style, which demonstrated how and why oral habits of composition persist in literate 
traditions. Recent work on the cognitive psychology of memory by Baddeley (1990) and 
applied specifically to oral arts forms by Rubin (1995) and others (e.g., Minchin 2001) 
has corroborated Jousse’s findings. 
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most learned circles of the Hellenistic period (a stereotypically “bookish” 
age that saw the proliferation of libraries and the editing of classical texts on 
an unprecedented scale)
 
and could be invoked, as we shall see, to score 
humorous and rather sophisticated philosophical points.
7
 
Before we proceed to an analysis of this passage, it bears saying 
something at the outset about the relationship of Carneades’ rhetoric 
(including his use of quotation) to his philosophy. It is now generally agreed 
among modern scholars of ancient philosophy that Carneades’ use of 
antilogy and argument throughout his career was no mere sophistical display 
of arguing both sides of an issue or of making the weaker argument the 
stronger, but was philosophically motivated:
8
 to persuade someone of the 
truth and simultaneous untruth of two opposing sides of any argument only 
served to underscore the problems inherent in a person’s ability to accurately 
interpret the “impressions,” or phantasiai, that present themselves to the 
senses and buttressed the Skeptics’ belief that, in view of those problems, 
human beings should suspend ultimate judgment on all matters of truth.
9
 
Seen in this light, Carneades’ displays of verbal prowess are closer to 
Socratic interrogation (elenchus) than to epideictic oratory.
10
 His virtuosity, 
in other words, was aimed primarily at debunking unsupportable opinions 
and dispelling illusions.  
And yet, like the speeches and verbal give-and-take between Socrates 
and his interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues, Carneades’ dialectic is no less 
playful because it happened to have this serious philosophical end in view. 
As Huizinga noted long ago (1955:151), one looks in vain for any “clear and 
                                                
7
 For “traditional referentiality” see Foley 1991:38-60. 
 
8
 That this is now the opinio communis is indicated well enough by Striker’s 
article (2001) on Carneades in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. See, too, Long 1985:80, 
94. Yet it must be said that Carneades’ rhetoric is still sometimes misunderstood as 
sophism by modern commentators, e.g., Gruen 1984:342 (“The Athenian’s speeches were 
showpieces, a dazzling display of rhetorical virtuosity, seductive and disarming”), who 
follow ancient sources that were hostile to Academic skepticism (sources and discussion 
in Mette 1985; see also Garbarino 1973, vol. 1, testimonia 80-82; vol. 2, 365-70). 
 
9
 For a succinct account of the Skeptics’ position on this issue and Carneades’ 
contribution, see the discussion and helpful diagram in Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 
1:455-60; for this position as a reaction to Stoic teachings on the matter: ibid., 249-53. 
For a lucid orientation to the philosophy of ancient (as distinct from modern) Skepticism, 
see Striker 2001. 
 
10
 A point intimated by Brennan (1923:17-18), and well put by Wilkerson 
(1988:136-42). 
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conscious demarcation between play and knowledge” in philosophy. 
Huizinga’s stimulating (and to my mind convincing) discussion of the 
origins of philosophy in contests of wit and riddle-solving should remind us 
that ancient philosophy, for all its syllogisms, categories, and abstractions, 
remained in practice very close to the world of orality: “Leaving aside the 
question of how far the word ‘problem’ itself (provblhma)—literally ‘what 
is thrown before you’—points to the challenge as the origin of philosophic 
judgement,” Huizinga writes (115),  
 
[W]e can say with certainty that the philosopher, from the earliest times to 
the late Sophists and Rhetors, always appeared as a typical champion. He 
challenged his rivals, he attacked them with vehement criticism and 
extolled his own opinions as the only true ones with all the boyish 
cocksureness of archaic man. In style and form . . . philosophy [is] 
polemical and agonistic.  
 
Implicit in Huizinga’s formulation is that philosophy is also—at least in its 
penchant for controversy, disputation and debate—highly oral. Such 
antagonism, even flyting,
11
 among Hellenistic philosophers is, of course, a 
familiar “psychodynamic” of orality (to use Ong’s term; 1982:43-45), and 
another reminder that philosophy after Plato had not completely severed 
itself from its oral past, contrary to what is sometimes said.
12
 Carneades’ 
quip, to which at last we now turn, is a case in point. 
A certain Mentor of Bithynia, the anecdote informs us, an aspiring 
docent in the Academy,
13
 was found to have made sexual advances toward 
Carneades’ mistress. This situation soon came to Carneades’ attention, and 
when Mentor ventured to the Academy one day as usual to hear Carneades 
lecture, Carneades interrupted his lesson and rebuked Mentor publicly with a 
                                                
11
 A representative example of this is the name-calling by Epicurus at D.L. 10.8, 
to say nothing of the vitriolic ad hominem attacks of Diogenes the Cynic (cf. D.L. 6.24-
26, directed at Plato).  
 
12
 Take, for example, Havelock (1986:116), who says with respect to the death of 
the oralist Socrates that “by the time it was Plato’s turn to leave, in the middle of the 
fourth century, the Greek Muse had left the whole world of oral discourse and oral 
‘knowing’ behind her. She had truly learnt to write, and to write in prose—and even to 
write in philosophical prose.”  
 
13
 That Mentor is not just a fictitious straw man in this episode, but a real 
philosopher (from Nicaea) with connections to the Academy, is confirmed by his 
appearance in Philodemus’ Index Academicorum (Mette 1985:T 3b). See Capelle 1932. 
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concatenation of two lines from the Odyssey and a third from Sophocles’ 
Antigone. The source (D.L. by way of Favorinus) specifically says that 
Carneades did this spontaneously, or “off-the-cuff” in the midst of 
speaking—metaxu; levgwn (see Liddell 1996: s.v. metaxuv I.2.a)—a key 
detail in ascertaining the degree of “residual orality” or “recomposition-in-
performance” at work in this encounter.
14
 Here is the relevant passage, 
followed by a working translation:
 15
 
 
ou|tov" [= Carneades] pote Mevntoro" tou' Biqunou' maqhtou' o[nto" 
kai; par j aujto;n ejlqovnto" eij" th;n diatribhvn, wJ" ejpeivra aujtou' 
th;n pallakh;n oJ Mevntwr . . . metaxu; levgwn parwv/dhsen eij" 
aujtovn 
pwlei'taiv ti" deu'ro gevrwn a{lio" nhmerthv", (= Od. 4.384) 
Mevntori eijdovmeno" hjme;n devma" hjde; kai; aujdhvn.  
                                                                        (= Od. 2.268=401) 
tou'ton scolh'" th'sd j ejkkekhru'cqai levgw  
                                                                        (? Soph., Ant. 203) 
kai; o}" [i.e., Mentor] ajnasta;" e[fh 
 oiJ me;n ejkhvrusson, toi; d j hjgeivronto mavl? w\ka.  
                                                                                        (= Il. 2.52=444) 
 
One time, when Mentor of Bithynia, Carneades’ pupil, came to hear him 
lecture, Carneades composed a parody against him in the midst of 
speaking, since Mentor was trying to seduce his mistress: 
Here comes an old man from the sea, unerring, 
Having assumed the form of Mentor in speech and appearance. 
This man I declare has been banished from this school! 
Whereupon Mentor stood up and said: 
 [The heralds] made the pronouncement, and [the army] gathered 
 tout de suite. 
 
The processes of verbal selection and combination in this spontaneous 
linguistic performance are intimately connected to the context in which these 
lines appear in their respective source texts. Each verse, in other words, like 
a link in hypertext, opens up a window onto a much larger set of semiotic 
and aesthetic parameters to activate meaning.
16
 
                                                
14
 Ong’s and Nagy’s terms, respectively: see Ong 1982:57; Nagy 1996:15 and 
throughout. 
 
15
 Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this paper are my own. 
 
16
 “Selection” and “combination” are, of course, Saussurean terms; on the concept 
of thematic “activation” in an oral tradition, see Bakker 1993. 
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The first line Carneades uses is spoken by Eidothea to Menelaus 
during the hero’s sojourn in Egypt, where the “unerring old man from the 
sea” is the shape-shifter Proteus, Eidothea’s father. The second line, Od. 
2.268 (repeated at 2.401), describes Athena taking on the form of Mentor, 
the philosopher’s namesake, at Ithaca. The slight grammatical 
accommodation of the participle in that line (from feminine to masculine) to 
make it work in this new context is itself an established technique of 
Homeric poetics—a habit of composition that is not only pervasive in 
Homer proper, but found in Homeric centos as well, which I have argued 
elsewhere are a “regeneration” of Homeric verse that utilizes many of the 
same (oral) techniques that produced the original poems.
17
 Carneades’ 
Mentor, it is implied by the use of the word eidomenos (“having assumed 
the form”), is only a phantom of the “real” Mentor of Homer, the loyal 
guest-friend of Odysseus that Athena impersonates, who was entrusted by 
Odysseus with watching over his house and his wife while he was away at 
Troy (Od. 2.225-27). Rather, his pupil Mentor is chameleon-like and elusive, 
more like the shape-shifting Proteus, who, in an interesting parallel, was 
himself entrusted with a similar responsibility—the task of hospitably—and 
chastely—detaining Helen in Egypt, while the phantom (eidôlon) of Helen 
was taken by Paris to Troy.
18
 Whether or not there was ever a tradition that 
Proteus himself violated trust by trying to keep Helen as his own wife our 
extant sources do not say, though in Euripides’ Helen the whole plot 
revolves around Proteus’ son, Theoclymenus, trying to do this very thing.
19
 
But what is truly remarkable here is how in the space of only two 
spontaneously quoted lines from Homer, Carneades is situating Mentor and 
his alleged treatment of the mistress in a whole nexus of mythological 
                                                
17
 Discussion and examples—Homeric and centonic—in Usher 1998:35-56. The 
change of gender renders Carneades’ version of the line mildly unmetrical, though to 
count the resulting short syllable in the participle as long, coming as it does at the 
caesura, is not without precedent in Homer (cf. Il. 1.19 and elsewhere). 
 
18
 On the Proteus legend, see O’Nolan 1960; on the development of this post-
Homeric aspect of the Helen myth, see Austin 1994. 
 
19
 Euripides’ Proteus, who is dead and buried at the opening of the play, is 
portrayed as having been completely honorable in his intentions regarding Helen. But 
given the degree of invention in Euripides’ treatment of the myth, one wonders what lost 
material like Aeschylus’ satyr play, Proteus, might have contained. (As it is, too little 
survives to even guess; see Mette 1963:76-77.) From the scholiast on Od. 4.228 (= 
Hellanicus frag. 153 Jacoby 2005) we learn that the Egyptian king Thon once tried to 
rape Helen. 
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examples of trust and its violation, especially trust pertaining to the 
guardianship of women (Penelope on Ithaca, Helen in Egypt).
20
 
There are other, more subtle nuances in these first two lines of 
quotation as well. The verb pôleomai, for example, means properly “to 
come and go habitually,” suggesting that Mentor, in coming to the Academy 
as usual as if nothing were going on behind Carneades’ back, is particularly 
brazen and shameless. The adjective halios predicated of Homer’s Proteus, 
means, of course, “of, or pertaining to, the sea.” If that is the thought here, 
perhaps Carneades means simply to suggest Mentor’s provenance, coming 
as he does from across the sea. (Bithynia is in Anatolian Phrygia, across the 
Aegean from Attica.) More likely, however, especially given the fondness 
for puns, double entendres, and semantic abuse (catachresis) in parodies and 
in centos,
21
 is the possibility that the common, secondary meaning of 
halios—“worthless,” “empty,” “idle”—is in play here, which is also fully 
Homeric, albeit used mostly of things, not persons. The meaning of the 
adjective nêmertês, “not missing the mark,” “true,” “infallible,” “unerring” 
(formed from the negative nê plus the verb hamartanô), is also somewhat 
fluid in this new context. If predicated of Mentor in a straightforward way, it 
is of course wickedly sarcastic, especially when paired with halios (with the 
meaning “worthless/idle”). But one is tempted to take it in this context not as 
appositional, but as a hendiadys of sorts with halios; thus halios nêmertês = 
“truly worthless.” This nuance could, in fact, have been made explicit in 
spoken delivery with a very slight inflection of the voice by pronouncing the 
word nêmertes—the neuter form used adverbially, as it often is (though not 
in this sedes) in Homer.
22
 Alternately halios could well have been 
pronounced as an adverb, with a similarly slight change—haliôs—without 
upsetting the meter. While admittedly speculative, these possibilities in 
performance are not completely out of the question, given the blatant parody 
involved here in the first place. Be that as it may, the irony in calling Mentor 
nêmertes and then proceeding with the idea that he is only a semblance of 
himself (eidomenos, etc.) is surely not accidental, coming as it does from a 
Skeptic like Carneades for whom appearances were problematical to begin 
                                                
20
 What is more, this Mentor, like the Proteus of Homer (it is also implied), is not 
likely to give away his secret knowledge without a struggle (cf. Od. 4.415-20; 450-59). 
 
21
 See Usher 1998:46-50. 
 
22
 The adverbial form always appears as the penultimate word in the line, and 
usually with the verb ennepô; e.g., Od. 3.101—kaiv moi nhmerte;" ejnivspe"—and 
throughout. 
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with. But there is even more philosophical significance here than meets the 
eye, or ear. 
From Sextus Empiricus we happen to know that Carneades used the 
story of Helen’s eidôlon as an illustration in his arguments against the 
Stoics.
23
 In particular, the Helen exemplum was invoked to undercut the 
Stoic position that a “cognitive impression” (phantasia katalêptikê)—or “a 
[mental] impression capable of grasping (its object)” as Long and Sedley 
more correctly translate the phrase (vol. 1:250)—can be a sufficient and 
reliable criterion of truth: “When Menelaus returned from Troy and saw the 
true Helen there in the house of Proteus,” Carneades is said to have argued, 
 
having left her phantom on board his ship (over which the war had been 
fought for ten years), Menelaus took in an impression that was formed and 
stamped by an existing object and in accordance with that object,
24
 yet did 
not give his assent to it. Consequently his cognitive impression was a 
criterion so long as it had no impediment. But the cognitive impressions 
that he had on this occasion did have impediments because Menelaus 
simultaneously saw that he had left Helen under guard on his ship and it 
was not unconvincing to him that this Helen he had found on Pharos with 
Proteus was not the real one, but an illusion, as it were, or a ghost. Thus, a 
cognitive impression is not a criterion of truth without qualification, but 
only when it has no impediment.
25
 
 
                                                
23
 From Adv. Math. 7.253-60; Greek text (but no English translation of this 
portion) in Long and Sedley 1987:vol. 2:250.  
 
24
 “Existing object” here is R. G. Bury’s translation of the Greek huparchon; on 
this difficult term and the concepts it may represent in Carneades’ thought, see 
Hankinson 1997:168, n. 17. 
 
25
 kai; o{te ajpo; Troiva" Menevlao" ajnakomisqei;" eJwvra th;n ajlhqh' 
JElevnhn para; tw'/ Prwtei', [kai;] katalipw;n ejpi; th'" nevw" to; ejkeivnh" ei[dwlon, 
peri; ou| dekaeth;" sunevsth povlemo", ajpo; uJpavrconto" me;n kai; kat j aujto; to; 
uJpavrcon kai; ejnapomemagmevnhn kai; ejnapesfragismevnhn ejlavmbane fantasivan, 
oujk ei\ke de; aujth'/, w{sq? hJ me;n katalhptikh; fantasiva krivthriovn ejsti mhde;n 
e[cousa e[nsthma, au|tai de; katalhptikai; me;n h\san, ei\con de; ejnstavsei" . . . 
o{ te Menevlao" sunewvra o{ti ajpolevloipen ejn th'/ nhi; fulattomevnhn th;n 
JElevnhn, kai; oujk ajpivqanon me;n ejsti;n JElevnhn mh; ei\nai th;n ejpi; th'" Favrou 
euJreqei'san, favntasma dev ti kai; daimovnion. ejnqevnde oujc aJplw'" krithvrion 
givnetai th'" ajlhqeiva" hJ katalhptikh; fantasiva, ajll j o{tan mhde;n e[nsthma 
e[ch/. Emphasis added in the translation. 
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The Helen example appears again in Sextus’ summary of Carneades’ 
thought to explain the related notion of an “undiverted impression” 
(aperispastos phantasia), one that is “convincing” (pithanê—a Stoic term) 
by virtue of the percipient having no simultaneous impression that casts it 
into doubt.
26
 For Carneades, undiverted impressions were better than 
diverted ones, but ultimately he argued (against the Stoics) that “there is not, 
in any unqualified sense, any criterion of truth—not reason, not sensation, 
not impression . . . not any other existing thing. For all of these alike deceive 
us.”
27
 In Carneades’ view, the best that could be said about mental and 
sensory impressions as a basis for judgments was that they could be more or 
less “persuasive,” or “convincing,” and his reworking and refinement of the 
Stoic notion of a pithanê phantasia became the lynch-pin (and by-word) of 
Carneades’ whole epistemology.
28
  
 Once the quotation is considered with such an epistemology in view, 
the words demas and audê (“body/mien” and “voice”) in Od. 2.268 take on 
further significance. Compare, for example, Carneades’ enumeration of 
physical attributes like these as being a part of a complex set of sensory 
stimuli that a person must negotiate in interpreting an impression. Taking 
Socrates as his example, Carneades says: 
 
Someone who takes in an impression of a man necessarily also gets an 
impression of things to do with the man and with the extraneous 
circumstances—things to do with him like his color, size, shape, motion, 
conversation, dress, footwear . . . and everything else. So whenever none 
of these impressions diverts us by appearing false, but all with one accord 
appear true, our belief is all the greater.
29
 
                                                
26
 Adv. Math. 7.176-84; translation from Long and Sedley 1987:vol. 1:452, text in 
vol. 2:447-48. On Carneades’ notion of an undiverted impression, cf. ibid.:vol. 1:458: 
“Undivertedness . . . indicates the contribution of coherence and mutual corroboration to 
the strength of the judgements people make.” 
 
27
 Sextus Emp., Adv. Math. 7.159: oujdevn ejsti aJplw'" ajlhqeiva" krithvrion, 
ouj lovgo", ouj ai[sqhsi", ouj fantasiva, oujk a[llo ti tw'n o[ntwn. pavnta ga;r 
tau'ta sullhvbdhn diayeuvdetai hJma'" (text: Long and Sedley 1987:vol. 2:452; 
translation: vol. 1: 460). 
 
28
 Cf. Long and Sedley 1987:vol. 1:459-60. 
 
29
 Sextus Emp., Adv. Math. 7.176.3-10: oJ ajnqrwvpou spw'n fantasivan ejx 
ajnavgkh" kai; tw'n peri; aujto;n ãwJ~Ã crova" megevqou" schvmato" kinhvsew" 
lalia'" ejsqh'to" uJpodevsew" . . . tw'n a[llwn pavntwn. o{tan ou\n mhdemiva touvtwn 
tw'n fantasiw'n perievlkh/ hJma'" tw'/ faivnesqai yeudhv", ajlla; pa'sai sumfwvnw" 
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Also relevant here are the Stoic Chrysippus’ views on audê as a sensory 
stimulus (which he differentiated from phônê and dialektos). As Clay 
observes in her analysis of this formula line from the Odyssey, Chrysippus’ 
philosophical views were “manifestly an interpretation of Homeric usage,”
30
 
so Carneades may be poking some fun there as well since so much of 
Carneades’ thought is a reaction to Stoic ideas. This is, after all, the man 
who said—with a parody of the classic statement of the Stoic school’s debt 
to its greatest sage—“Were it not for Chrysippus, I would not exist” (D.L. 
4.62).
31
 
Given the philosophical positions sketched above, we now see that 
Carneades is using the Homer quotations to declare Mentor to be—tongue, 
no doubt, in cheek, but with some resentment perhaps as well—a diverted 
impression: as an accused philanderer, Mentor seems other than what he was 
previously thought to have been by the percipient (Carneades). More to the 
point, we also see why the Odyssey quotations came to Carneades’ mind in 
composing his impromptu indictment. These lines arose spontaneously 
(metaxu legôn) because the contexts in which they occur in Homer are 
thematically related to a philosophical illustration that was already in 
Carneades’ repertoire—namely Menelaus’ disbelief in seeing the real Helen 
and the whole cluster of themes associated with that episode. As is well 
known from the study of “composition by theme” in Homer and other oral-
traditional poetry, familiar contexts bring to mind appropriately familiar 
words and phrases (that is, formulas).
32
 Carneades’ realization of these lines 
from the Odyssey involves similar mental processes. To put it another way, 
based on his competence as a reader and auditor of Homer, Carneades is 
readily able to recall (and adapt) Homeric lines to suit his purpose.
33
  
                                                                                                                                            
faivnontai ajlhqei'", ma'llon pisteuvomen (text: Long and Sedley 1987:vol. 2:447; 
translation: vol. 1: 452). 
 
30
 Clay 1974:131-32, citing Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta II, 144. 
 
31
 eij mh; ga;r h\n Cruvsippo", oujk a[n h\n ejgwv, parodying the Stoic boast eij 
mh; ga;r h\n Cruvsippo", oujk a[n h\n stoav (“Were it not for Chrysippus, the Stoa 
would not exist”; D.L. 7.183). 
 
32
 The classic discussion of “composition by theme” is by Lord (1951 and 
1960:68-98); on the related phenomenon of the type-scene, see Arend 1933 and the 
overview of type-scene scholarship in Edwards 1992. 
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That the rebuke of Mentor was understood in antiquity to have had the 
philosophical dimension I am suggesting it had here is clear from a brief 
report about this episode in Numenius of Apamea’s fragmentary history of 
the Academy.
34
 Numenius was an admirer of Carneades’ talents as a 
dialectician and orator, but was not himself sympathetic with Carneades’ 
thought,
35
 and so, looking back at this episode over two centuries later, he 
saw in it a humorous indictment of Carneades’ radical skepticism:
36
 
 
Mentor was a close acquaintance of Carneades at first, but by no means 
did he become his successor. For while he was still alive, Carneades 
discovered Mentor having sex with his mistress and experienced no mere 
“persuasive impression” (pithanês phantasias), nor, so to speak, did he fail 
to take in a “cognitive impression” (mê kateilêphôs)
37
 of the matter, but 
fully believing his own eyes, took in what he saw (katalabôn)
38
 and 
disbarred Mentor from the school. And so Mentor left and began to rival 
Carneades in cleverness and rhetorical skill, refuting (elengchôn) the 
“incomprehensibility” (akatalêpsian) of his discourses.
39
 
                                                                                                                                            
33
 On the use of “competence” and “generation” (Chomskyan terms) of the 
reception and reproduction of oral poetry by literate persons, see Usher 1998:10. That 
philosophers could be fluent in such composition is noted briefly by Stemplinger 
(1912:278), who attributes this fluency to the rhetorical training they would have 
received in school. On the influence of declamation on cento composition, see Usher 
1998:28-31. 
 
34
 This is the only other reference to the Mentor affair. It is preserved in Eusebius’ 
Praeparatio Evangelica (= frag. 27 des Places 1973:78, who provides text, notes, and 
French translation). 
 
35
 In fact, the purpose of his account of the Academy is to show how far 
Academics had fallen from Plato; see Dillon 1996:365-66. 
 
36
 Numenius subjects Carneades’ predecessor, Lacydes, and the Skeptic doctrine 
of “suspension of belief” (epochê) to similar ridicule with a story about Lacydes’ 
predictable reaction to slaves caught red-handed stealing from his storeroom (frag. 26 des 
Places 1973; cf. D.L. 4.59). 
 
37
 As des Places notes, “ le verbe katalambavnein,” here and throughout Numenius’ 
account, “fait penser à la katalhptikh; fantasiva” (1973:77 n. 7). 
 
38
 Or, with a play on the word, literally “caught Mentor in the act.” 
 
39
 Karneavdou de; givnetai gnwvrimo" Mevntwr me;n prw'ton, ouj mh;n 
diavdoco" : ajll j e[ti zw'n Karneavdh" ejpi; pallakh/' moico;n euJrwvn, oujc uJpo; 
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Just how skillful and clever Mentor was in his rebuke on this particular 
occasion we shall see presently. (We know nothing else about him or his 
subsequent career.) For the moment, however, it remains to consider the 
third line in Carneades’ rebuff. It too exhibits the same kinds of thematic 
correspondence and habits of impromptu composition that we have seen at 
work in the Odyssey quotations.  
The line, from Sophocles’ Antigone (verse 203), is spoken by Creon 
about Polyneices, who by Creon’s decree has been forbidden burial at 
Thebes. Carneades’ reworking of Sophocles’ line involves at least one 
substitution of a word and a change of case—from “city” to “school” and 
from the dative case to the genitive: “I herewith declare this man banished 
from this school” (tou'ton scolh'" th'sd j ejkkekhru'cqai levgw). Like 
grammatical accommodation (seen here and above in the Odyssey quotation 
about Mentor), the substitution of individual words and phrases (here 
scholês têsd’ for Sophocles’ polei têid’) in “template” phrases or “structural 
formulas”—a hallmark of oral poetics—is typical of cento composition and 
parody as well.
40
 Carneades’ change from “city” to “school” was of course 
necessary in this new context and intentional, but his use of levgw, also at 
odds with the received text of Sophocles, is a more complicated and 
interesting affair. It is instructive to follow this trail for a moment, since it 
traverses important territory concerning the relationship of texts to oral 
traditions that is relevant to Carneades’ performance here. A conspectus of 
Carneades’ version of the line juxtaposed with the reading of the 
manuscripts and the various other readings that have been proposed by 
modern editors will give an indication of the nature of the problem: 
 
1. tou'ton scolh'" th'sd j ejkkekhru'cqai levgw = Carneades  
2. tou'ton povlei th'/d j ejkkekhru'cqai tavfw/ = codices  
                                                                                                                                            
“piqanh'" fantasiva"” oujd j wJ" mh; kateilhfwv", wJ" de; mavlista pisteuvwn th'/ 
o[yei kai; katalabw;n parh/thvsato th'" diatribh'". oJ de; [i.e., Mentor] ajposta;" 
ajntesofivsteue kai; ajntivtecno" h\n ejlevgcwn aujtou' th;n ejn toi'" lovgoi" 
ajkatalhyivan (frag. 27 des Places 1973). 
 
40
 See Usher 1998:38-44. On the formula as a mental template, see Nagler 1967; 
on “structural formulas,” Russo 1976. With Carneades’ substitution here, compare Nero’s 
parodic reworking (in the context of the great fire at Rome) of an unattributed line from 
Greek tragedy—ejmou' qanovnto" gai'a meicqhvtw puriv (“When I am dead, let the 
world be confounded in fire”)—the participle of which Nero was in the habit of changing 
in quotation to zôntos (“[nay] when I am alive!”; Suet., Nero 38.1). 
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3. tou'ton povlei th'/d j ejkkekhru'cqai levgw = Nauck, appealing to this 
passage in D.L.
41
 
4. tou'ton povlei th'/d j ejkkekhvruktai tavfw/ = Jebb/Lloyd-Jones-
Wilson, following Musgrave
42
 
 
Nauck, we see, accepted Carneades’ legô; Jebb and recently Lloyd-Jones 
and Wilson do not. Jebb, in fact, says baldly: “The line of Carneades . . . is 
no argument for levgw in the text of Sophocles” (1900:48). And yet he says 
on the same page of his commentary that the MSS’ unanimous reading of 
the infinitive ekkekêruchthai, which is used also in the Carneades quotation, 
“can only be explained by supplying levgw or the like.” And yet Jebb’s 
solution, which is followed by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson in the OCT, was to 
change the infinitive ekkekêruchthai to an indicative, ekkekêruktai, rather 
than to adopt Carneades’ legô.
43
 Jebb speculated that “the MS error may 
have arisen from a reminiscence of ejkkekhru'cqai in [line] 27,” where it 
occurs cheek-by-jowl (though Jebb does not say so in his remarks) with the 
word taphôi: 
 
ajstoi'siv fasin ejkkekhru'cqai to; mhv / tavfw/ kaluvyai . . . (Ant. 27-
28) 
 
The word taphôi was obviously no good to Carneades, so if that were the 
original reading at line 203, he would have had to change it. On the other 
hand, to inform Jebb’s own argument with an awareness of the dynamics of 
oral poetics, one might just as well posit that the contamination in 
Sophocles—if that is indeed what it is—comes from a different, not strictly 
textual, source.  
Note, for example, how both the indicative and infinitive forms of 
ekkêrussô here are virtually homophonous in pronunciation (ekkekêruchthai 
vs. ekkekêruktai). Only the order of the consonants (“rough” chi + theta 
versus “smooth” kappa + tau) and the accent are different (circumflex on the 
penult vs. acute on the antepenult), and these features would barely be 
noticed, and could in fact be masked, de-emphasized or even confused, in 
                                                
41
 Nauck 1867 ad loc. 
 
42
 Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990 ad loc. 
 
43
 On the principle, no doubt, of lectio difficilior, according to which the “more 
difficult” reading is most likely the correct, original reading intended by the author (that 
is, less apt to have been changed by a copyist). 
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spoken delivery.
44
 Consider, too, that the larger context of Creon’s speech in 
the Antigone deals with friendship, loyalty, and cohesion in the community. 
I would argue that these themes, also evoked by the quotations from the 
Odyssey, rather than the desire to impersonate a tyrannical Creon, are what 
called line 203 to Carneades’ mind. Mentor, after all, like Polyneices, is 
being accused of violating personal trust, and, by extension, in Carneades’ 
view, the trust of his community—the Academy—as well. As it happens, in 
one of two telling expressions of this theme earlier in Creon’s speech 
Sophocles uses the verb legô in the same metrical position as in Carneades’ 
quotation, whereas with the infinitive in line 27, thought by Jebb to be the 
source of the “MS error” at line 203, he does not.
45
 Given two sources of 
contamination, I find it more likely that it would come from the closer of the 
two—and, what is more, it is not so much an “error” as a fact of cognition to 
repeat similar words and phrases in similar contexts. As Miller notes in his 
sensible discussion of repetition in oral and orally-derived traditions 
(1982:45): “Use of a motif, formula, or unusual word restores it to active 
memory and any subsequent elaboration is apt to contain one or more 
recurrences of it.” None of this of course proves that Sophocles wrote legô 
in his script of the Antigone, but it does suggest that Carneades found 
himself contextually enmeshed in his source text and that his spontaneous 
realization of Antigone 203 was affected by such factors. Carneades’ 
adaptation of Sophocles’ line, in other words, bears all the marks of a 
recomposition-in-performance, one that responds thematically and 
compositionally to the narrative situation he found himself in with Mentor. 
Mentor’s reported response—oiJ me;n ejkhvrusson, toi; d? hjgeivronto 
mavl j w\ka (Il. 2.52=444)—is equally spontaneous and brilliant. Mentor 
picks up on the key-word kêrussô in the quotation from Sophocles and runs 
with it. Here, too, the poetics of quotation resemble Homeric poetics proper, 
where key-words often function as “triggers” in composition.
46
 Of the two 
                                                
44
 Homophonic substitution is a characteristic feature of the cento. See Usher 
1998:49-51. 
 
45
 Compare Ant. 182-83 (o{sti" ajnti; th'" auJtou' pavtra" / fivlon nomivzei, 
tou'ton oujdamou' levgw) and 186-7 (ou[t j a]n fivlon pot j a[ndra dusmenh' cqono~ 
/ qeivmhn ejmautw'/). 
 
46
 See Clark 1997:53-62; for semantic and lexical triggers in the cento form, see 
Usher 1998:106-11. See also Jousse 1925:203-25. On the psychology of this 
phenomenon, see Rubin 1995:161-67, 304-5 (using the term “cues”). 
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related contexts in which Mentor’s quotation occurs, surely the first is felt 
most strongly here, Il. 2.52, where Agamemnon, having just woken up from 
a dream that instructed him to rally the troops for battle, proceeds instead to 
test them, offering them immediate passage home, to see where their true 
loyalties lie. The thematic connection between Carneades’ assertions and 
Mentor’s response becomes readily apparent: the tyrant Creon tests public 
and personal loyalty in the Antigone and it backfires on him, leading to the 
deaths of both Antigone and his son, Haemon. The tyrannical Agamemnon 
does the same in the Iliad, and it too ends in (momentary) disaster when the 
troops decide to take him up on his offer to go home. Mentor, in effect, has 
turned Carneades’ Antigone quotation against him by indirectly equating the 
Scholarch—by quotation—with the Iliad’s Agamemnon in a context where 
Agamemnon closely resembles Creon. The semantic link in this thematic 
chain is the key-word kêrussô. Given the context of this line in the Iliad, 
Mentor may also be making a philosophical parry of his own, suggesting 
that Carneades, like Agamemnon, “is dreaming,” or laboring under a false 
impression, if he truly thinks him guilty as charged. The dream in the Iliad 
was, after all, a deceptive one, taking on the form and likeness of Nestor 
(with phraseology reminiscent of Carneades’ Od. 2.268
47
). Carneades has 
misread the situation, it is implied, and, like Agamemnon (and Creon), he 
may come to regret it. Perhaps there is something to be said, too, for the 
word used to describe Mentor’s attempt on the nameless mistress, epeira, a 
common euphemism for sexual seduction,
48
 which also happens to be the 
theme word of Agamemnon’s “testing” of the troops, the episode being 
known since Hellenistic times as the diapeira after its occurrence as a theme 
word in that portion of Book 2 (cf. peirêsomai in 2.73). 
Whether Mentor was guilty in the end or not, we shall never know, 
but the confrontation between him and Carneades provides us with a 
fascinating glimpse into how the spontaneous quotation of poetry could be 
an effective medium of invective, philosophy, and wit. The orality of the 
exchange is evident not only in the agonistic context of a live, public 
performance, but also in the way these poetic lines are used, adapted, and 
concatenated. The proposition that one will find oral residue in more literate 
phases of culture is not in itself controversial or surprising.
49
 The majority of 
                                                
47
 mavlista de; Nevstori divw/ / ei\dov" te mevgeqov" te fuhvn t j a[gcista 
ejwv/kein (Il. 2.57-58). 
 
48
 See Henderson 1975:158. 
 
49
 Cf. Ong 1982:157: a “manuscript culture . . . [is] always marginally oral.” 
 ORALITY AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 205 
 
ancient Greek and Roman readers were, after all, reared on the recitation of 
oral and orally-derived poetry. But the persistence of oral modes of 
expression and thought among philosophers is revealing. We are reminded 
again of Huizinga’s account of ancient philosophy as a form of play—a 
leftover from a more fully oral past. As it happens, Numenius inadvertently 
corroborates this observation for us in his history of the Academy, for he 
casts the vicissitudes of the School with an extended metaphor as an intra- 
and extramural battle of epic proportions. He even composes a cento of his 
own using formulaic descriptions of battle from Homer to drive the point 
home.
50
 That the conflicts and controversies in Hellenistic philosophy were 
also sometimes self-consciously a contest between orality and literacy may 
be seen in Numenius’ remarkable contrast of Carneades with his chief rival, 
Antipater of Tarsus, head of the Stoic school. Ironically—or perhaps 
intentionally—this characterization immediately precedes his account of 
Carneades’ fully oral and spontaneous contest with Mentor: “Every opinion 
of Carneades was victorious and never any other,” Numenius writes, 
 
since those with whom he was at war were less powerful as speakers. 
Antipater, for instance, who was his contemporary, was intending to write 
something in rivalry; in face, however, of the arguments which Carneades 
kept pouring forth day after day, he never made it public, neither in the 
Schools, nor in the public walks, nor even spoke or uttered a sound, or, it 
is said, did anyone ever hear from him a single syllable: but he kept 
threatening written replies, and hiding in a corner wrote books which he 
bequeathed to posterity, that are powerless now, and were more powerless 
then against a man like Carneades, who showed himself eminently great, 
and was so considered by the men of that time.
51
 
 
                                                
50
 Frag. 25 des Places 1973, consisting of Iliad 4.447-49, 13.131, 4.472, and 
4.450-51. 
 
51
 Trans. by Gifford 1903:795. Pa'sa gou'n diavnoia ejnivka kai; oujdemiva 
hJstiou'n a[llwn, ejpei; kai; oi|" prosepolevmei h\san eijpei'n ajdunatwvteroi. 
jAntivpatro" gou'n oJ kat? aujto;n genovmeno" e[melle me;n kai; ajgwnia'n ti 
gravfein, pro;" d? ou\n tou;" ajpo; Karneiavdou kaq? hJmevran ajpoferomevnou" 
lovgou" ou[pot? ejdhmosiveusen, oujk ejn tai'" diatribai'", oujk ejn toi'" peripavtoi" 
oujde;n ei\pen oujd? ejfqevgxato oud? h[kousev ti" aujtou', fasivn, oujde; gru'. 
ajntigrafa;" d? ejpaneteivneto kai; gwnivan labw;n bibliva katevlipe gravya" toi'" 
u{steron, ou[te nu'n dunavmena kai; tovte h\n ajdunatwvtera pro;" ou{tw" a[ndra 
uJpevrmegan fanevnta kai; katadovxanta ei\nai toi'" tovte ajnqrwvpoi" to;n 
Karneavdhn. 
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One would be hard pressed to find a starker contrast between the relative 
merits of orality and literacy and their attendant tensions among 
philosophers in the Hellenistic age. As Carneades’ verbal exchange with 
Mentor throws into high relief, this contrast is—as Carneades himself might 
have agreed—the ultimate antilogy.
 52
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